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Building a System of Military Justice
Through the All Writs Act
This note considers the use of extraordinary writs' by the Court of
Military Appeals2 during its 1975-76 term. Past use of this power and the
limitations thereon are also discussed in an effort to place its current use in
perspective. During that term COMA issued two major decisions which
dealt with extraordinary relief: Courtney v. Williams and McPhail v. United
States.4 Courtney involves, principally, the way in which extraordinary
relief can be used.5 McPhail deals with the determination of when it may be
used.
MCPHAIL: ESTABLISHMENT OF GENERAL SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION
In McPhail, Judge Cook, an infrequent supporter of extraordinary
writs, 6 refused to allow COMA's lack of potential appellate jurisdiction, as
defined by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),7 to deny the court
the power to reverse a conviction when it felt that the initial court-martial
was without jurisdiction over the offense charged.8 This seems to be
precisely the type of case for which the use of extraordinary relief is intended.
'Through the All Writs Act Congress made available to its judicial bodies broad ranging
powers. "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
prindples of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970). While congressional intent in regard to this statute is
unclear, it may have been designed to grant to all courts created by congressional authority
similar powers to interpret their jurisdiction as was claimed in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), for those courts whose authority is derived from article III of the
Constitution. The House Report dealing with this Act states: "The revised section (1651, All
Writs Act) extends the power to issue writs in aid of jurisdiction, to all courts established by Act
of Congress, thus making explicit the right to exercise powers implied from the creation of such
courts." HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REvIsION OF T=TE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, H.R.
REP. 3214, 80th ,Cong., Ist Sess. A145 (1947). Thus, the flexibility to achieve overall justice
which the interpretation ofjurisdiction made in Marbury may have brought to article III courts
is mide available to all courts through the All Writs Act.2Hereinafter COMA.
324 C.M.A. 87, 51 C.M.R. 260 (1976).
424 C.M.A. 304, 52 C2M.R. 15 (1976).
5Courtney v. Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87, 51 C.M.R. 260 (1976). See notes 40-74, infra, & text
accompanying.
6See Courtney v. Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87, 51 C.M.R. 260 (1976); Porter v. Richardson, 23
C.M.A. 704 (1975); Milanes-Canamero v. Richardson, 23 C.M.A. 710 (1975); Phillippy v.
.Mcl.iicas, 23 C.M.A. 709 (1975); Kelly v. United States, 23 C.M.A. 567, 50 C.M.R. 786 (1975);
Thomas v. United States, 23 C.M.A. 570, 50 C.M.R. 789 (1975).
7Articles 66 and 67 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 866-67 (1970), define the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Military Appeals. Appellate jurisdiction is made contingent on the
potential sentence which the accused may receive. The offense charged in McPhail did not carry
a sufficient sentence to allow it to reach COMA byway of appellate review. McPhail v. United
States, 24 C.M.A. 304, 52 C.M.R. 15 (1976).
8McPhail v. United States,'24' C.M.A. 304, 310, 52 C.M.R. 15, 21 (1976).
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COMA clearly has authority to interpret court-martial jurisdiction 9 and
could have been denied authority to act in the McPhail case only by the
mechanical jurisdictional limitations of the UCMJ. COMA's ultimate
interpretation, in McPhail, of the jurisdictional limits of the UCMJ involved
the resolution of a difficult issue on which the court had wavered for over a
decade.
The Jurisdictional Limits in the UCMJ
Since its first reference to extraordinary relief in 1954,10 COMA has
struggled with the development of standards for its use. The most
significant issue to date has focused on the UCMJ and the proper
interpretation of statutory jurisdiction provided therein."
In 1966 COMA declared that it held the power to grant extraordinary
relief under the All Writs Act12 saying: "Part of our responsibility includes
the protection and preservation of the Constitutional rights of persons in the
armed forces."' 13 One year later this "responsibility" broadened to a "general
supervisory power over the administration of military justice."' 4 In 1968
COMA squarely addressed the issue of statutory jurisdictional limitations
upon its use of extraordinary writs and declared that "Article 67 does not
describe the full panoply of power possessed by this Court."'- Despite its
strong words, COMA denied the extraordinary relief requested in all of these
cases.
9Fleiner v. Koch, 19 C.M.A. 630 (1969), applying O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258
(1969).
,,In United States v. Ferguson, 5 C.M.A. 68, 17 C.M.R. 68 (1954), the concurring opinion
by Judge Brosman stated the belief that COMA came within the "broad sweep" of the All Writs
Act. Id. at 86. In both United States v. Buck, 9 C.M.A. 290, 26 C.M.R. 70 (1958), and United
States v. Tavares, 10 C.M.A. 282, 27 C.M.R. 356 (1959), the court assumed it held the power to
issue extraordinary writs for the sake of argument without deciding the issue. Finally in In re
Taylor, 12 C.M.A. 427, 31 C.M.R. 13 (1961), the court said only: "Undoubtedly, it [COMA] afso
has incidental powers, the limits of which, however, we have not attempted to define." Id. at
430, 31 C.M.R. at 16. It then makes reference to the All Writs Act and to Buck. In addition to
references to the All Writs Act there are also many specific references to the need to guarantee
constitutional safeguards in the military justice system. See, e.g., United States v. Jacoby, 11
C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (1960), where the court states that "the protections in
the Bill of Rights, except those which are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are
available to members of our armed forces."
"See note 7 supra. These limiting provisions should be interpreted, however, in light of
the broad purpose of the creation of COMA to promote Uniformity in the judicial process and to
discover and correct defects in the system and its administration. See SENATE COMM. ON ARMED
SERVICES, ESTABLISHING A UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, S. REP. No. 486, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1950).
12See note I supra.
13United States v. Frischholtz, 16 C.M.A. 150, 152, 36 C.M.R. 306, 308 (1966).
"Gale v. United States, 17 C.M.A. 40, 42, 37 C.M.R. 304, 306 (1967).
IsUnited States v. Bevilacqua, 18 C.M.A. 10, 11, 39 C.M.R. 10, 11 (1968). This case involved
a convication for possession and use of marijuana under Article 134 leading to a sentence of
reduction in grade and partial forfeiture of pay, a sentence not within COMA's statutory
jurisdiction.
[Vol. 52:189
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The Supreme Court, however, in the 1969 case of Noyd v. Bond,1 6 took
note of COMA's dicta in those earlier cases and warmly embraced COMA's
original declaration of authority to issue extraordinary writs. The Supreme
Court did indicate, however, that any extension of that authority beyond
statutory bounds17 would be questionable. Shortly after this hint from the
Supreme Court and a mere nine months following its "full panoply"
declaration in regard to Article 67,18 COMA said of that declaration:
What we there stated concerning our duty and responsibility to correct
deprivations of constitutional rights within the military system must be
taken to refer to cases in which we have jurisdiction to hear appeals or to
those to which our jurisdiction may extend when a sentence is finally
adjudged and approved. 19
This complete reversal of COMA's position is explainable only by the
persuasive power of the Supreme Court.2 0
The Supreme Court's persuasive power was again wielded in 1972 when
the Court exercised its own privilege to reverse fields by suggesting that only
COMA can determine the breadth of its jurisdiction.21 In McPhail COMA
was able to return to its original declaration2 2 by seizing upon the Supreme
Court's suggestion and declaring that the jurisdictional limitations of the
16395 U.S. 683 (1969).
17[W]e do not believe that there can be any doubt as to the power of the Court of
Military Appeals to issue an emergency writ of habeas corpus in cases, like the present
one, which may ultimately be reviewed by that court. A different question would, of
course, arise in a case which the Court of Military Appeals is not authorized to review
under the governing statutes. Cf. United States v. Bevilacqua, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 39
C.M.R. 10 (1968).
Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 695 n.7 (1969).
IsSee note 15 supra & text accompanying.
19United States v. Snyder, 18 C.M.A. 480,483,40 C.M.R. 192, 195 (1969). This case involved
a conviction for adultery under Article 134 leading to a sentence of reduction in grade, a
sentence not within COMA's statutory jurisdiction.20Professor Wacker suggests that Snyder should not be read as a retreat from Bevilacqua
since on its face Snyder did not present a situation where issuance of the writ was appropriate.
Wacker, The "Unreviewable" Court-Martial Conviction: Supervisory Relief Under the All
Writs Act from the United States Court of Military Appeals, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. Civ. RIGHTs-
L. REv. 33 (1975). However, the opposite view is more plausible. Since the writ could easily have
been denied on those grounds, the fact the court acted to dismiss the petition on the mechanical
grounds of jurisdiction reemphasized its desire to limit Bevilacqua.
2'Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1971). The Court stated.
That court [COMA] has been given no "jurisdiction" to consider a serviceman's
claim for discharge from the military as a conscientious objector.
Whether this conceptual difficulty might somehow be surmounted is a question
for the Court of Military Appeals itself to ultimately decide. See United States v.
Bevilacqua, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 39 C.M.R. 10 (1968).
Id. at 44. This was not a complete reversal in that the Court reiterated its belief that the stuatory
provisions do limit COMA's extraordinary writ jurisdiction.22See note 15 supra & text accompanying.
19761
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
UCMJ are no limit on the authority of COMA to issue an otherwise
appropriate writ.23 The government had argued in McPhail that since the
case could not reach COMA under Article 67, the court had no jurisdiction.
COMA concluded, however, that its supervisory jurisdiction over the
military justice system was not limited solely to those cases within Article 67
and that it could issue the writ in aid of this supervisory jurisdicti.--. 24
Other Limitations on the Use of Extraordinary Relief: Extraordinar'"
Circumstances and Exhaustion of Remedies
In addition to the jurisdictional limitation, now avoided by the McPhail
decision, COMA has employed two other concepts in limiting the use of the
All Writs Act: extraordinary circumstances and exhaustion of remedies. Both
of these limitations were adopted from COMA's civilian court counterparts.
The requirement that the petitioner, in the civilian context, show
extraordinary circumstances implements a desire to avoid the adverse effects
of orders aimed at lower court judges unless the circumstances outweigh
such concerns. This limiting concern for lower court authority seems to hold
less importance in the military justice system, where extraordinary writs are
directed chiefly to commanders rather than judges. However, the fact that it
is command authority itself which is being. questioned makes the issue very
significant to the overall military establishment. In the early cases in which
COMA either acknowledged or assumed the power to issue extraordinary
writs, denial of the actual writ was based upon a lack of extraordinary
circumstances. 25 Unfortunately the concept is not well defined. Cases
involving various types of writs can be found which indicate a willingness
by the court to grant relief based upon inadequate remedy26 while others,
citing exhaustion of remedies, never reach the issue of extraordinary
circumstances. 27 The concept of extraordinary circumstances is often stated
but rarely defined.
Unlike the concept of extraordinary circumstances, the concept of
23"Reexamining the history and judicial applications of the All Writs Act, we are
convinced that our authority to issue an appropriate writ in 'aid' of our jurisdiction is not
limited to the appellate jurisdiction defined in Article 67." McPhail v. United States, 24 C.M.A.
304, 390-91, 52 C.M.R. 15, 20-21 (1976).21The court specifically said that to the extent Snyder viewed the court's jurisdiction under
the All Writs Act as limited to cases within Article 67, Snyder was "too narrowly focused."
McPhail v. United States, 24 C.M.A. 304, 310, 52 C.M.R. 15,21 (1976).25See cases cited note 10 supra.26See Zamora v. Woodson, 19 C.M.A. 403, 42 C.M.R. 5 (1970) (clear lack of jurisdiction);
Lowe v. Laird, 18 C.M.A. 131, 39 C.M.R. 131 (1969) (pretrial confinement); Jones v. Ignatius, 18
C.M.A. 7-,39 C.M.R. 7 (1968) (preservation of COMA's jurisdiction); Levy v. Resor, 17 C.M.A.
135, 37 C.M.R. 399 (1967) (post-trial conviction).27See Catlow v. Cooksey, 21 C.M.A. 106, 44 C.M.R. 160 (1972); Font v. Seaman, 20 C.M.A.
387, 43 C.M.R. 227 (1971); Walker v. Commanding Officer, 19 C.M.A. 247,41 C.M.R. 247 (1970);
Dale v. Hay, 19 C.M.A. 254, 41 C.M.R. 254 (1970); Taylor v. Resor, 19 C.M.A. 405, 42 C.M.R. 7
(1970); Hallinan v. Lamont, 18 C.M.A. 652 (1968).
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exhaustion of remedies28 has developed around a specific provision in the
UCMJ, Article 138.29 This article, through its broad language, is designed to
provide service personnel with an appeal to the next higher commander for
any wrong committed against them by their immediate commanding officer.
As is often true with such broad provisions, Article 138 seems ill-suited to
deal with the specific and often immediate needs which prompt a petition
for an extraordinary writ.3 0 The use of this doctrine has placed an additional
burden upon petitioners as well in that the court requires them to show an
abuse of discretion by the higher commander to whom they have appealed
under Article 138 before it will overturn that decision.31 This requirement
has been applied with a heavy deference for the commander's decision.3 2
In at least one area it seems that the requirement of appeal to the next
higher commander may be declining in importance. In 1973 the court
ignored this requirement and reached the issue of improper confinement
despite the lack of any indication that an appeal under Article 138 had been
taken.33 The majority again failed to deal with this particular exhaustion of
remedies limitation in the confinement cases decided during the 1975-76
28The foundation of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine lies in a desire to allow
administrative agencies an opportunity to apply their specialized knowledge to cases within
their fields, thus avoiding unnecessary litigation and allowing a court the benefit of the
agencies' knowledge. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969). This principle seems less
applicable to the use of extraordinary relief in most military courts, although a further concern
underlying this principle is the avoidance of the usage of writs as a substitute for the appellate
process. Banker's Life and Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953).29Article 138 provides:
Any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his
commanding officer, and who, upon due application to that commanding officer, is
refused redress, may complain to any superior commissioned officer, who shall
forward the complaint to the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over
the officer against whom it is made. The officer exercising general court-martial.
jurisdiction shall examine into the complaint and take proper measures for redressing
the wrong complained of; and he shall, as soon as possible, send to the secretary
concerned a true statement of that complaint, with proceedings had thereon.
10 U.S.C. § 938 (1970). Cases citing this limitation are cited at note 27 supra.30An Army publication recently expressed this point in regard to pretrial restraint: "Relief
by way of the Article 138 process is of dubious merit because, lacking a specific time limitation,
it does not provide the necessary immediate relief from the unlawful confinement. Inordinate
delay in processing the complaint could moot the issue." Unlawful Pretrial Confinement, 7, #3
The Advocate, Newsletter for Military Defense Counsel 2, 6 (1975).51
"The type of restraint, if any, to be imposed upon an accused prior to trial presents a
question for resolution by the commanding officer, in the exercise of his sound discretion. His
decision will not be reversed in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion." Homer v.
Resor, 19 C.M.A. 285, 286, 41 C.M.R. 285, 286 (1970). See also, Smith v. Coburn, 19 C.M.A. 291,
41 C.M.R. 291 (1970); Levy v. Resor, 17 C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399 (1967).
s2Cf. United States v. Nixon, 21 C.M.A. 480, 485, 45 C.M.R. 254; 259 (1972) (dissenting
opinion). Judge Duncan, in his dissent, suggested that a more thorough review of the need for
restraint should have been made in light of United States v. Jennings, 19 C.M.A. 88, 41 C.M.R.
88 (1969) wherein the court dealt at length with the issue of whether confinement was necessary.5 3Newsome v. McKenzie, 22 C.M.A. 92, 46 C.M.R. 92 (1973).
1976]
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term.3 4 Judge Cook's dissent in Porter v. Richardson3s emphasized the
majority's omission and attempted to justify the commander appeal process
of Article 138.36 The somewhat mechanical points emphasized by Judge
Cook stand in stark contrast to the majority's failure even to mention the
topic. It appears the majority is implying that these mechanical points do
not merit consideration or repudiation. Rather than arguing them away, the
majority went directly to consideration of the substantive issues involved
with confinement. Since the majority was so obvious in skirting these
mechanical bottlenecks, which have been prevalent in past cases,3 7 it appears
that mechanical limitations are being lifted in favor of dealing directly with
the substantive issues of each writ.38 A discussion of extraordinary writs,
however, is incomplete without reference to the particular form of relief
34See cases cited note 6 supra.
3523 C.M.A. 704 (1975).
16Judge Cook cites United States v. Hartsook, 15 C.M.A. 291, 35 C.M.R. 263 (1965), which
deals only with probable cause for.searches, and Levy v. Resor, 17 C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399
(1967) which mechanically applied the Article 138 requirement. See note 27 supra. Cf. cases
cited note 26 supra. He further attempts to equate the referral of charges by the commander to a
court martial with an indictment by a grand jury in the civilian judicial system, thereby
justifying restraint. Support for this contention is found in United States v. Nix, 15 C.M.A. 578,
36 C.M.R. 76 (1965), which suggested that Article 34, 10 U.S.C. § 834 (1970), is analogous to the
federal procedure of preliminary examination; but that article gives no indication that it was
intended to carry the burden of placing the full safeguards of a grand jury into the hands of one
individual. The support cited in Nix and repeated by Judge Cook in his dissent is United States
v. Roberts, 7 C.M.A. 322, 22 C.M.R. 112 (1956), which quoted an article by Judge Latimer, A
Comparative Analysis of Federal and Military Criminal Procedure, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1955). In
his article, Judge Latimer had stated that "something roughly analogous to the federal
procedure of pieliminary examination and grand jury indictment is obtained in the military
through the use of a formal pretrial investigation and convening authority consideration." Id.
at 5 (emphasis added). Apparently, between 1955 and 1965, the rough edges vanished and the
analogy became perfected. Finally Judge Cook cites the Manual for Courts-Martial 1 21c,
United States, 1969 (rev.) [hereinafter cited as MCM], which denies any power to the military
judge -to alter pretrial restraint except in his presence. This deference to the Manual arises from
Petty v. Moriarity, 20 C.M.A. 438, 43 C.M.R. 278 (1971), which relies upon United States v.
Smith, 13 C.M.A. 105, 32 C.M.R. 105 (1962). The latter case states:
Some of the cases in this Court, in referring to paragraph 140a [of the Manual], state
the same "is binding on this Court." This is possibly unfortunate language insofar as
it may carry a connotation that this Court is in anywise bound by Presidential
directives or regulations any more than is any other court. Manifestly, any such
implication must be rejected.
Id. at 119, 32 C.M.R. at 119. The court in Smith continues to say that the provision "has the
force of law and is entitled to consideration by this Court, as by all others, in that light." Id. The
court there appeared to consider the "force of law" to be somewhat different from a "binding
provision"; but whatever the proper connotation it is clear that COMA is prepared to overrule
the Manual when necessary. See United States v. Varnadore, 9 C.M.A. 471, 26 C.M.R. 251 (1958);
United States v. Cothern, 8 C.M.A. 158, 23 C.M.R. 382 (1957); United States v. Wappler, 2
C.M.A. 393, 9 C.M.R. 23 (1953).
S7This appears to be true for the jurisdiction of military judges, as well, for the court
praised Judge Wood in Bouler v. Wood, 2a C.M.A. 589, 50 C.M.R. 854 (1975), in regard to his
willingness to accept the responsibility to consider the pretrial confinement issue and his power
to deal with it.38This should not, however, be taken as a suggestion that extraordinary writs will issue
with any great regularity. As have been observed:
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granted, since the substantive issues and available mechanical, provisions
vary with the relief requested. This note therefore turns to the specific use of
extraordinary relief as applied in'the 1975-76 term to pretrial confinement.3 9
COURTNEY: EXERCISE OF GENERAL SUPERVISORY JURISDIcrxoN
Courtney v. Williams" and other cases during the 1975-76 term4 1 dealt
with the use of extraordinary relief in the context of pretrial confinement.
Courtney petitioned COMA for extraordinary relief in order to challenge the
legality of his confinement. After inviting and receiving briefs and oral
argument on the issues by appellate divisions in the various services as
arnicus curiae, 42 the court held that in the absence of a military necessity
which would dictate to the contrary the fourth amendment required that an
independent body make the determination of probable cause.43 The court
specifically noted that the UCMJ fails to provide for such a hearing,44
implying that the court has a duty to fill such gaps in the Code as may
[I]t is only the exercise of forbearance that has limited the role of the court from
more frequent interference in interlocutory questions. The court has set forth broad
general outline's as to when extraordinary relief will be granted, and by denials of
specific petitions has for practical purposes established other considerations which
often are raised to the level of prerequisites before the relief will be granted. The net
result is a great restriction on the number of petitions granted, and this in spite of the
court's asserted power to give the requested relief.
Q. Richardson,. Survey and Effect of Recent Extraordinary Writ Decisions (March 1975)
(unpublished thesis presented to The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army).59This is not a random selection in that the 1975-76 term dealt principally with petitions
for release from pretrial restraint.
4024 C.M.A. 87, 51 C.M.R. 260 (1976).
41See note 5 supra.42Courtney v. Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87, 88, 51 C.M.R. 260, 261 (1976). The court's language
referring to the amicus proceedings strongly suggests an approach more characteristic of
administrative agency rulemaking than judicial adjudication. Id. The accuracy of this
impression is supported by the fact that the court's decision requiring an independent
determination as to probable cause and the need for restraint, see note 54 infra & text
accompanying, came not only more than two months after petitioner's release from pretrial
confinement, but after he was tried, convicted, and sentenced. Id. at 90, 51 C.M.R. at 263.43The Supreme Court did not deal directly with an Article 13 type requirement, see note 41
supra & accompanying text, which considers the type of restraint permnissable, because of the
availability of bail in civilian courts. Absent this right to bail in the military, COMA read
Gerstein as dealing broadly with both probable cause and the need for restraint.
1124 C.M.A. at 89, 51 C.M.R. at 262. The UCMJ authorizes the restraint of enlisted
personnel on the authority of any commissioned officer, and of any service member on the
authority of the commanding officer. 10 U.S.C. § 809 (1970). The Manual for Courts-Martial has
elaborated on these provisions of the UCMJ by placing the authority to release one who has
been confined solely in the commanding officer. MCM IT 22, 1969 (rev.).
The authority to order confinement is restricted by Article 9d of the UCMJ which requires
probable cause of guilt before confinement may be imposed. 10 U.S.C. § 809 (1970). In addition,
Article 13 places a limit on the nature of restraint permissible before trial: "[N]or shall the arrest
or confinement iniposed upon [the accused] be any more rigorous than the circumstances
require to insure his presence [at trial] .. " 10 U.S.C. § 813 (1970).
In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Supreme Court dealt with parallel
substantive concerns in the civilian justice system and held that due process requires the
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abridge constitutional rights. 45 Such constitutional significance may in the
future be interpreted as a prerequisite of extraordinary relief of the Courtney
genre. This should not be taken to mean, however, that extraordinary relief
will be forthcoming only when constitutional rights are involved. Other
cases this term demonstrate that COMA continues to grant relief in less
compelling circumstances.
In Kelly v. United States 6 and Thomas v. United States,4 7 COMA
considered the propriety of petitioners' confinement in the United States
Disciplinary Barracks while awaiting a possible rehearing after a reversal of
their convictions.4 8 Having rejected the technical objection urged by the
government that there was no showing of service of process upon it,49 and
having found that a referral of charges for a rehearing had not mooted the
issue, the court said nothing about reviewing the need for confinement;
rather it ordered petitioners released from the Disciplinary Barracks,5 0 citing
Article 13.51 This indicates that the majority thought that confinement in the
Disciplinary Barracks prior to trial is a prima facie violation of Article 13.
approval of a detached magistrate if pretrial confinement is to be continued after initial
detention. 420 U.S. at 114. A full hearing with all constitutional safeguards was not required but
rather an assurance that someone other than the initiator of confinement would review the
finding of probable cause for arrest and detention. 420 U.S. at 123. The analogous safeguards in
the military justice system were recently considered by the Eighth Circuit and found faulty in
three ways: the decision to continue confinement is made by the "prosecutor"; no hearing is
allowed; and the burden is upon the accused to show a lack of need for continued restraint.
DeChamplain v. Lovelace, 510 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated as moot, 421 U.S. 996 (1975). In
view of Article 13, the court ordered a hearing to be held in regard to continued confinement. It
must be remembered that Article 10 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 810 (1970), guarantees that when a
person is placed in pretrial confinement, "immediate steps shall be taken.., to try him or
dismiss the charges against him." COMA has held that when pretrial confinement exceeds
ninety days, a rebuttable presumption of an Article 10 violation exists, and the charges may be
dismissed. United States v. Marshall, 22 C.M.A. 431, 47 C.M.R. 409 (1973) (expanding the
Burton standard to delineate situations when the presumption may be rebutted); United States
v. Burton, 21 C.M.A. 112, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971). See MCM 68i, 1969 (rev.).
45The court's decision continues its acknowledged duty to correct what it considers to be
any deficiency in existing Code provisions. See United States v. Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. 428, 29
C.M.R. 244 (1960).
4623 C.M.A. 567, 50 C.M.R. 786 (1975).
4723 C.M.A. 570, 50 C.M.R. 789 (1975).48The only major distinction between these cases is the reversing forum: Kelly was reversed
by the Army Court of Military Review while COMA itself reversed the decision in Thomas. The
distinction is important, however, for in Kelly COMA ordered the ACMR to review the petition:
"[W]e are returning this petition to the United States Army Court of Military Review in order
for that Court to exercise its extraordinary writ authority." 23 C.M.A. at 568, 50 C.M.R. at 787.
In Thomas COMA placed the duty to act upon itself, thereby suggesting that Kelly is intended
to affirm the power of the CMR's to issue extraordinary writs and their duty to take that
responsibility when their actions have led to its necessity. This may then serve as an avenue to be
exhausted in future COMA decisions though it is significant that the court did not use it here as
a complete bar to action on its part.49
"We decline to hold this in propria persona petitioner absolutely responsible for
knowing all of our rules." Kelly v. United States, 23 C.M.A. 567, 568, 50 C.M.R. 786, 787 (1975).
Old. at 568, 50 C.M.R. at 787.
5
'See 10 U.S.C. § 813 (1970).
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The dissent insisted that the court assume that individuals awaiting final
determination of their convictions through appeal are to be treated
differently from those whose convictions are final.5 2 It is this argument
which indicates the true difference of opinion within the court. The dissent
equated the reversal of a conviction and authorization of a rehearing to the
continuation of the reviewing process of one convicted at a court-martial.
The majority found that such a reversal qualifies the accused as one awaiting
court-martial so that the concerns of pretrial restraint again become relevant.
Although the court here acted through an extraordinary writ to serve
notice to those in the military justice system that the rights of an accused
whose status changes must be continuously safeguarded during the judicial
process, 53 nevertheless it should be observed that the holding comprises no
pronouncement of a legislative nature. Rather, the court in Kelly and
Thomas utilizes the petitioners' request for extraordinary relief to employ.its
supervisory jurisdiction in making an adjudicative determination: the court
deemed petitioners to have been in pretrial confinement and found such
confinement improper on the facts of those cases.
In Courtney the court went further and employed its supervisory
jurisdiction, again through a request for extraordinary relief, to establish,
prospectively, procedural requisites for proper pretrial confinement.
Courtney, in implementing its independent hearing requirement, sets
out two criteria to be considered in determining if confinement is
appropriate: probable cause and the need for restraint. The latter is involved
chiefly with the consideration of the effect of confinement upon one's ability
to prepare for trial.54 This was the principal substantive concern in the
court's opinion and with it there can be little dispute; however the court
exercised its extraordinary writ jurisdiction without suggesting either
standards for applying this doctrine or means for its application. An attempt
to consider the application of Courtney, therefore, may reveal some insight
into the problems which arise through such use of extraordinary relief.
The Application of Courtney
Courtney requires a review of pretrial restraint by a neutral and detached
magistrate in regard to probable cause and the need for restraint. These
broad principles, however, are inadequate to deal with difficult substantive
issues. The court is not to be criticized for a failure to enunciate all aspects of
the standard for review since that will necessarily be dependent upon
development in future cases. 55 The real failure of the court lies in its failure
52Kelly v. United States, 23 C.M.A. 567, 569, 50 C.M.R. 786, 788 (1975).53It is puzzling that the majority did not order a review of petitioner's confinement; but
perhaps it felt that the decisions in Porter and Phiflippy would suffice to inform the convening
authority that such review was necessary.54 Courtney v. Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87, 51 C.M.R. 260 (1976).
55COMA issued a show cause order to an Army magistrate on March 25, 1976 in Iturralde-
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to overrule the "abuse of discretion" standard that COMA has applied in the
Article 138 commander appeal context.5 6 This may leave the burden upon
the petitioner to show that the type of restraint imposed is unnecessary. A
footnote in Courtney cites a federal court case which places the burden on
the government to show the need for restraint 7 and thus implies the removal
of the burden from petitioner. McPhail, however, suggests that this standard
is still good law58 so that reliance upon the commander's initial decision
appears likely.
Another question raised but unanswered in Courtney is which body is to
have the responsibility of reviewing pretrial confinement. COMA appears to
desire to regularize this review so as to remove it from the extraordinary writ
area by providing an alternative forum which may itself become a remedy to
be exhausted. In the cases preceding Courtney during the 1975-76 term,5 9 the
court ordered the military judge to whom a charge had been referred to
convene an Article 39a hearing to review this issue. That article allows the
military judge to rule on any matter within his authority as defined by the
UCMJ; 60 but there is no provision within the UCMJ granting authority to
the judge to rule on the confinement issue. Further, the Manual for Courts-
Martial specifically limits such authority to alteration of an accused's
restraint only when in the presence of the court-martial. 61 The court may
have intended to supplement the judge's authority under the Manual
through this extraordinary writ decision.62 But if the court here did intend to
Aponte v. Kasson, Miscellaneous Docket No. 76-21. This case may help set the standards lacking
in Courtney.
56See note 31 supra & text accompanying.
57Courtney v. Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87, 90 n.13, 51 C.M.R. 260, 263 n.13 (1976), citing
DeChamplain v. Lovelace, 510 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated as moot, 421 U.S. 996 (1975).
58"This is not to say, however, that our extraordinary jurisdiction can be invoked for all of
the errors that can be reviewed by way of ordinary appeal under Article 67. See... Homer v.
Resor .. " McPhail v. United States, 24 C.M.A. 304, 310, 52 C.M.R. 15, 21 (1976). See note 31
supra.
59Porter v. Richardson, 23 C.M.A. 704 (1975); Milanes-Canamero v. Richardson, 23 C.M.A.
710 (1975); Phillippy v. McLucas, 23 C.M.A. 709 (1975).
60Artice 39a provides in part:
At any time after the service of charges which have been referred for trial to a
court-martial composed of a military judge and members, the military judge may,
subject to section 835 of this title (article 35) [which provides time for preparation by
the accused], call the court into session without the presence of the members for the
purpose of -
2. hearing and ruling upon any matter which may be ruled upon by the
military judge under this chapter [the UCMJ], whether or not the matter is
appropriate for later consideration or decision by the members of the court. ...
10 U.S.C. § 839a (1970).
61MCM Vl 21(2)c, 1969 (rev.).62The court stands upon firm precedent in this action since many past cases have suggested
this power for the judge. For example, in Hallinan v. Lamont, 18 C.M.A. 652 (1968), the court
required the petitioner to seek redress under Article 138 but also suggested that if such relief was
denied, the accused could renew his request before a military judge.
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grant such authority to the military judge, it has apparently not determined
that he can act prior to a referral of charges. 63
Perhaps realizing the deleterious effect which the limitations of Article
39 have on the ability of a military judge to deal with the problem of
reviewing pretrial confinement, the court mentioned in a footnote that
Article 32c provides for proceedings prior to the referral of charges. 64 Article
32 provides a forum roughly analogous to a preliminary hearing in civilian
courts, but it is presided over by a commissioned officer rather than a judge.65
The lack of standards for review discussed above, especially in regard to
deference to the commander's discretion,66 may have a greater impact upon
the layman than upon a military judge. This commissioned officer is within
the authority of the commander whose decision on restraint is to be
reviewed, so that the likelihood of deference to the commander's& decision 67
may be even greater. If an Article 32 investigating officer is to make the
decision required by Courtney, it is even more important that clear standards
be delineated for his use. Further, the Article 32 investigation is not required
to be held within any particular time following an accused's restraint, but
rather upon the discretion of the commander, so that lack of a mechanism to
assure a timely review of pretrial restraint by an independent body remains.
It is significant, however, that COMA did not merely refer to Article 32
in general, but specifically to section c thereof, which suggests the possibility
of an investigation outside Article 32 prior to the referral of charges.68 The
reference to this article may be intended to provide support for the possibility
6Judge Cook's dissent in Phillippy v. McLucas, 23 C.M.A. 709 (1975) opposed the
authority of a judge to act before a referral of charges and the majority's decision merely ordered
the convening authority to make such referral immediately if he intended to do so and allow the
judge to review the need for restraint. In Bouler v. Wood, 23 C.M.A. 589, 50 C.M.R. 854 (1975),
the court said of Judge Wood's consideration of, but forbearance on, the issue of pretrial
restraint: "His concern and foresight recognizing the necessity for judicial process while at the
same time the possible limits to the exercise of his powers can only serve as a model for other
judges." Id. at 590, 50 C.M.R. at 855.
64Courtney v. Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87, 90 n.13, 51 C.M.R. 260, 263 n.13 (1976).
6510 U.S.C. § 832 (1970).
6"See notes 61-64 supra & text accompanying.
67McPhail itself involved a case of deference to the commander in that the judge had
conducted the court-martial only because the convening authority had disagreed with the
judge's initial ruling and ordered the judge to proceed. In the absence of a statement from
COMA to the contrary the judge believed he must acquiesce to the convening authority's
decision. McPhail v. United States, 24 C.M.A. 304, 306, 52 C.M.R. 15, 17 (1976).
68Article 32c provides:
If an investigation of the subject matter of an offense has been conducted before
the accused is charged with the offense, and if the accused was present at the
investigation and afforded the opportunities for representation, cross-examination,
and presentation prescribed in subsection (b), no further investigation of that charge
is necessary under this article unless it is demanded by the accused after he is informed
of the charge. A demand for further investigation entitles the accused to recall
witnesses for further cross-examination and to offer any new evidence in his own
behalf.
10 U.S.C. § 832(c) (1970).
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of investigations beyond those required by the UCMJ, so as to allow the type
of investigation of pretrial restraint the court has required. Section c's
support for this possibility is weak, however, in that it specifically refers to
"investigation of the subject matter of an offense." 69 If this citation was
meant to encourage review outside of the UCMJ, the court leaves unsettled
the question of who should conduct this review, although in another
footnote it applauds the Army's effort to establish a magistrate system.7 0
Given that the Air Force has proposed that the convening authority review
pretrial restraint,71 in clear contradiction to Courtney, it seems the court's
failure to name a forum may undermine its efforts to provide a remedy for
those placed in pretrial restraint.
In his concurrence in Courtney, Judge Ferguson expanded upon Judge
Fletcher's opinion for the court by adding words with which Judge Fletcher
perhaps could agree only in principle. He expressed the view that the role of
the military judge is closely analogous to that of a federal judge, though he
refused to admit that pretrial confinement is an issue which only a judge can
resolve.7 2 This concurrence suggests a possible avenue for future issues of an
extraordinary character in that it begins the development of the military
judge as a truly potent force.73
To summarize the basic points in regard to pretrial confinement, COMA
has determined that the right to review of one's pretrial confinement by an
independent body must be assured to those in the military, without regard to
the ultimate form of appeal available by statute. Both pretrial restraint,
whether one is charged with murder or with possession of marijuana, and
the fourth amendment rights of all accused of an offense, must be preserved.
Many questions remain open, however, since COMA has not said who will
determine the need for continued restraint, what specific standards will be
applied, or who will bear the burden of proof in regard to the reversal of the
69Id.
70Courtney v. Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87, 51 C.M.R. 260 (1976).
"Air Force Manual 111-1, 13-25, Military Justice [proposed 1 3-25 on file with the
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL].
72Judge Ferguson's view is supported by the Senate Report on the 1968 amendment to the
UCMJ. See SENATE COMM. ON ARMED SERVIcES, MILITARY JUsTIcE Act oF 1968, S. REP. 1601,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The general purposes of the provisions concerning the military
judge were "[T]o redesignate the law officer of a court-martial as a 'military judge' and give him
functions and powers more closely allied to those of Federal district judges ... " Id. at 3. The
repo.t goes on to say:
The effect of the amendment, generally, is to conform military criminal procedure
with the rules of criminal procedure applicable in the U.S. district courts and
otherwise to give statutory sanction to pretrial and other hearings without the
presence of the members concerning those matters which are amenable to disposition
on either a tentative or final basis by the military judge.
Id. at 9-10. This broad wording would appear to sanction the determination of the need for
restraint even before the referral of charges.
7sSee Stevenson, The Inherent Authority of the Military Judge, 17 A.F.L. REv. 1
(Summer 1975).
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initial decision of the commander. It seems that the only certain method of
assuring impartial review is the delegation of the power to appoint the
reviewing magistrate to one who is totally outside of the line of command,
such as the Judge Advocate General for each service. Even better would be a
regional system of magistrates appointed by the Judge Advocate General for
the defense establishment to serve all branches of the service via tele-
communications. But no matter who receives the task it must be made clear
to those who conduct the actual review that all authority rests in them
without deference to the decision of the commander. Appointment of
individuals with legal training may better fulfill this need. Development of
specific standards will grow from the review of these "magisterial" decisions,
and extraordinary writ jurisdiction cannot be withdrawn from this area until
such standards have become clear.
THE FUTURE
Two important results arise from the court's decisions during the 1975-
76 term. The mechanical limitations so often and so arbitrarily used in the
past seem to be giving ground to more substantive concerns. Perhaps as the
court broadens the powers of military judges, it will retreat from this
approach and cite exhaustion of remedies and deference to the military
judge. This view is strenghtened by the fact that Courtney is all dicta, since
the petition was denied,74 and by the fact that COMA had little choice but to
act in the area of pretrial restraint given recent federal court decisions. 75
On the other hand, COMA in both- Courtney and McPhail, used broad
language and citation to past cases which recognized a supervisory role for
COMA in the military justice system to support its actions. 76 Further the
court made references this term to the Code of Professional Responsibility77
and the ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice.78
These references, along with COMA's recent proposal of broad rules of
procedure for all military courts, 79 suggest COMA desires to increase its
influence upon the entire system and build a uniform system of military
justice.80 The federal courts clearly appear ready to place this task in the
hands of the military courts.8 '
7424 C.M.A. 87, 51 C.M.R. 260 (1976).
75See note 44 supra & text accompanying.
76Courmey v. Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87, 51 C.M.R. 260 (1976); McPhail v.'United States, 24
C.M.A. 304, 52 C.M.R.-15 (1976).
77Kidd v. United States, 24 C.M.A. 25, 51 C.M.R. 75 (1975).
78Courmey v. Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87, 51 C.M.R. 260 (1976).
79COMA is presently proposing sweeping changes in its Rules of Practice and Procedure
[on file with the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL]. Proposed Rules 11 and 12 would grant to COMA
broad powers in regard to the qualification and disciplinary review of attorneys practicing
before any courts in the military justice system.
"
0Non-judidal punishments provided by Article 15 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970), as
well as administrative discharges may require further scrutiny by COMA as the due process and
personal property rights implications become clearer.
81The UCMJ establishes an independent system of jurisprudence for the military and
Article 76 of the UCMJ provides that where appellate eview has proceeded through all of the:
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The other aspect of the court's decision in Courtney8 2 is its legislative
nature. The problems discussed above in regard to the application of this
case83 may suggest the difficulty of using this form of jurisdiction to resolve
difficult issues of military justice. Given the willingness of the federal courts
to give a free rein to the military courts,8 4 there appears to be little to stop
COMA other than the Congress. Congress speaks, however, through the
UCMJ which COMA itself interprets.
COMA may have faced these issues squarely in an effort to develop a
system of military justice, or-it may not. If the court has decided to expand its
influence, it will need the assistance of advocates within the system to help
formulate this expansion. At present few standards exist for a determination
of the use of extraordinary relief; but enough has been done by COMA to
declare open season for those who are willing to take the first shot at the
substantive issues which must be resolved.
MICHAEL E. BROWN
steps available the results "are final and conclusive." 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1970). The Supreme
Court, rather than finding this provision a bar to the Court's potential review, interpreted it to
denote the exhaustion of military review and therefore determinative of the steps required prior
to seeking relief in the federal courts. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128 (1950). Three years later in
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), the Supreme Court addressed this issue once again and
asserted that it had full power to review, by habeas corpus, the rulings of a military court. At the
same time, however, the Court recognized that the standard for review of military adjudications
must reflect the military's unique needs by stating that "when a military decision has dealt fully
and fairly with an allegation.., it is not open to a federal civil court to grant the writ simply to
re-evaluate the evidence." 346 U.S. at 142. This idea was carried one step further in 1968 when
the court suggested that the review must rely upon issues of constitutional significance. United
States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1968). This line of precedent indicates that the federal courts
intend to leave to the military courts the independence the UCMJ established and the task of
assuring the justice it was designed to promote. Cf. Henry v. Middendorf, 96 S. Ct. 1281, 1291-92
(1976).
8224 C.M.A. 87, 51 C.M.R. 260 (1976).
3See notes 55-73 supra & text accompanying.
84See note 81 supra.
